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INTRODUCTION
In his article, Scott Cummings proposes that there existed an "old
canon" concerning how to be a lawyer for progressive social justice
causes, which has been replaced by a different "new canon" that envisions
the role of movement lawyers quite differently.' According to Cummings,
old canon lawyering places courts "at the heart of the canonical stories."2
New canon lawyering, on the other hand, involves using legal institutions
other than courts and focuses on the intersection between law and politics.3
Cummings gives examples of the old and new ways of lawyering and also
draws conclusions about what causes the momentum of social movements
to slow. One of Cummings' central arguments is that the critique of what
he calls old canon lawyering is in many respects misplaced.4
I wholeheartedly agree with Cummings' thesis that much of the
critique of the "old" way of engaging in social movement lawyering is
misplaced; here I offer some additional or alternative reasons why. To sum
up my argument, I do not believe there is much of a difference between
old versus new perspectives on the range of appropriate strategies for
social movement lawyering. Historically as today, social movement
lawyers understood that sometimes courts are useful but sometimes they
are not. Looking in the long view, so-called "old canon" lawyers have
understood this just as "new canon" lawyers do. Instead, the most
significant difference between the lawyering styles Cummings labels
* Professor of Law and Vice Dean, American University Washington
College of Law; J.D., Yale Law School.
1. Scott Cummings, Law and Social Movements: Reimagining the Progressive
Cannon, 2018 Wis. L.REv. 441, 451.
2. Id. at 445.
3. Id. at 451.
4. Id. at 442 (stating that his article "points toward a potentially significant
conclusion: that the progressive critique of old cannon lawyering is misplaced."); id. at 500
("the old canon critique of progressive lawyering may have less to do with the advocates
and more with the nature of their adversaries.") (emphasis omitted).
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"old" versus "new" canon involves lawyers' heightened sensitivity to the
ethical problems that arise in social movement lawyering. I briefly develop
these arguments below.
I. "OLD CANON" LAWYERING
Cummings indicates that the critique of what he views as "old canon"
lawyering is in effect the longstanding critique of legal liberalism.' As
historian Ken Mack has explained, legal liberalism involves a set of ideas
related to seeing
courts as the primary engines of social transformation; formal
conceptual categories such as rights and formal remedies such
as school desegregation decrees as the principal mechanisms for
accomplishing that change; and ... reforming public institutions
(or, in some versions, public and private institutions without
much distinction) as a means of transforming the larger society.6
Cummings presents several examples of "old canon" lawyering. Each of
these, however, belies this definition of what "old canon" or "legal liberal"
lawyering involved.
Cummings' first example involves the twentieth century United
States labor movement.7 Yet the leading canonical stories about the history
of the labor movement, which both Christopher Tomlinss and William
Forbath9 tell in their classic works, are stories about moving courts out of
the way of people trying to solve problems. The initial "hero" in these
accounts is federal legislation, in the form of the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935 (NLRA), which set up processes that take labor disputes out
of the jurisdiction of courts and instead place them in local, voluntary
arenas governed by contact law.' 0 A federal administrative agency, the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), serves as referee. Thus, the labor
movement does not support the claim that "old canon" lawyering idealized
courts as the locus for social change. Courts, prone to issuing anti-labor
injunctions and otherwise siding against workers, were the villains in the
labor movement story.
5. Id. at 444 (discussing the critique of legal liberalism).
6. Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking CivilRights Lawyering and Politics in the Era
before Brown, 115 YALEL.J. 256, 258 (2005).
7. Cummings, supra note 1, at 445-46.
8. See CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS,
LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, at 102 (1985).
9. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR
MOVEMENT 118-125 (1991).
10. The NLRB Process, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD,
https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrb-process [https://perma.cc/S8C2-4GQ4].
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To be sure, the statutory and administrative heroes of this canonical
story-i.e., the NLRA and the NLRB-though virile and attractive when
young, later became tired and ineffectual. Yet even in its older middle age,
the NLRB developed administrative law doctrines under the NLRA that
provided a site for gains in racial equality in employment during the 1970s
and before, as historian Sophia Lee has shown." As Lee argues
persuasively, civil rights historians had heretofore failed to place enough
emphasis on these administrative arenas for social change lawyering.12
In short, the labor movement illustrates that "old canon" lawyering
did not necessarily regard courts as the most effective forums for social
change. It provides an example of a social movement that successfully
moved courts out of the business of primary dispute resolution. The
movement utilized a combination of statutory, administrative, and private
law to scaffold spaces for contract-based, negotiated solutions to local
problems.
Cummings' second example of the old canon is Brown v. Board of
Education.13 Brown, to be sure, exemplifies a court-centered campaign for
school desegregation. However, this is a story told through the lens of
hindsight. At the time that lawyers were engaging in the litigation that led
to Brown, civil rights advocates saw this initiative as one of many
important projects in a multifaceted campaign for racial justice. A perusal
of Loren Miller's important but often-overlooked classic, The Petitioners,
supports this point. '4 Miller, an important civil rights litigator during the
middle years of the twentieth century, published a book toward the end of
his life analyzing the United States Supreme Court's role in the civil rights
movement. The book has twenty-nine chapters, each devoted to a different
set of Supreme Court precedents relating to the racial justice struggle,
including voting rights, lynching, higher education, criminal defense,
public accommodations discrimination and residential segregation, among
others." On this crowded docket, Miller devotes only one chapter to
Brown. 6
My work on an earlier historical phase of what led to the period now
called the "civil rights" movement discusses late nineteenth and early
twentieth century racial justice activist-lawyers' views of the courts.' 7 The
11. See Sophia Z. Lee, Hotspots in a Cold War: The NAACP's Postwar
Workplace Constitutionalism, 1948-1964, 26 L. & HIST. REv. 327, 328 (2008).
12. See id.
13. Cummings, supra note 1, at 441 (citing Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483
(1954)).
14. LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO (1966).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 347-64.
17. SUSAN D. CARLE, DEFINING THE STRUGGLE: NATIONAL ORGANIZING FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE, 1880-1915 (2015).
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idea of "test case "litigation already existed.' Yet lawyers and other
activists held clear-eyed views about the potential of courts. They
accurately perceived both the benefits and drawbacks of litigation as a
social change tactic. In a period in which the courts were generally
unsympathetic to civil rights claims, lawyers understood that they would
probably lose civil rights cases.' 9 They filed them anyway, for several
reasons. One involved organization-building tactics, i.e., having
something concrete around which to organize.20 Another was to highlight
the hypocrisy exposed by the contrast between the United States' founding
ideals and its then-current practices. 2 ' Lawyers talked about using adverse
results in litigated cases on the international stage to shame the United
States for the failures of its justice system. 22 One leader described Supreme
Court justices as "deficient in legal acumen," and "swayed by
colorphobia." 23 Although these lawyers did share the then commonly-held
belief in the potential inherent justice of natural law, they did not think that
the human beings charged with enforcing law were anywhere near ready
to do justice.24 Moreover, although this generation of racial justice lawyers
litigated cases for strategic reasons, they spent more time fighting
legislative battles, both offensive and defensive, at both the national and
the state levels. 25
Racial justice lawyers in this early period were, as I conclude, far
from naive legal liberals. 2 6 I Similarly doubt-and have seen little
evidence-that lawyers in later eras were.2 7 To be sure, in the very
different historical era of the 1960s and early 1970s, with a far more
sympathetic Court, it did make sense to use the courts as one of many
vehicles for bringing about social change. All lawyers make these kinds of
strategic judgments about which legal avenues are the most promising to
pursue in a particular context, so it seems to me wrong to fault lawyers for
such judgments when reasonably made.
18. Id. at 55-56 (discussing late nineteenth-century test case litigation).
19. See id. at 44.
20. Id. at 55-56.
21. See, e.g., id. at 41.
22. Id. at 56 (quoting one lawyer who argued that litigation losses on
constitutional law principles would expose the United States to all nations as worthy of
contempt).
23. Id. at 4 1.
24. Id. at 40 (describing natural law views of lawyers of this period).
25. Id. at 58-62, 140-51 (describing state and federal legislative campaigns).
26. Id. at 5 (debunking legal liberalism as a motivating force in the historical
period examined in the book).
27. Ann Southworth's important empirical work reaches this conclusion. See
Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the "Myth ofRights" in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice,
8 B.U.PUB. INT. L.J. 469, 469 (1999) (concluding that civil rights and poverty lawyers are
better described as "engaged political strategists than as myopic technicians").
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Brown has become iconic in the literature on the civil rights
movement. This is in part because it was important, both because the
plaintiffs won (which was far from a sure bet, as suggested by the insider
report that the first vote among the Court's members came out in favor of
the defendants), 28 and because the case eventually led to massive
restructuring of student assignments to public schools.
Yet Brown has also taken on primary salience in the popular narrative
history of the civil rights movement because it fits the normative
worldview of prominent voices in telling that story. Scholars such as Yale
Law School professor Owen Fiss deeply believed in legal liberalism.
Brown was the perfect main character for developing that elegant and
inspiring narrative.29 Other scholars have told alternative narratives-
about many stops and starts, uncertainties and internal debates, along with
much activity in many arenas. These campaigns included work on political
matters and economic redistribution, rather than solely on court-focused
and formal civic rights issues.30 Their accounts have not received the same
visibility in part because they make for messier and less satisfying popular
consumption.
The remedial phase of Brown became the subject of Derrick Bell's
hard-hitting portrayal.3 1 According to Bell, who had been a NAACP Legal
Defense Fund (LDF) lawyer handling such cases, LDF insisted that its
clients sign on to full school integration as the sole remedial goal of this
litigation.32 LDF did so even when its individual clients (i.e., the minority
parents and students relegated to segregated schools) held other goals,
such as obtaining more resources for their local schools.33 That insistence
contravened the important legal ethics precept that clients should be
entitled to be the final decision-makers concerning the goals of their
cases. 34
This ethics awareness is where I think the real difference between old
and new canon lawyering resides. Thanks to Bell and countless others who
28. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CivIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-61, at 187 (1994) (describing Justice Douglas's
recollections after the first post-argument conference among the Justices about Brown).
29. See, e.g., OWEN Fiss, PILLARS OF JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND THE LIBERAL
TRADITION 1-2 (2017).
30. See, e.g., THOMAS F. JACKSON, FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS:
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE (2007) (exploring
civil rights themes related to economic inequality); NIKHIL PAL SINGH, BLACK IS A
COUNTRY: RACE AND THE UNFINISHED STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY (2004) (investigating
activists' work on economic issues).
31. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976).
32. Id. at489-93.
33. Id. at 47 1.
34. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983) ("[A]
lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation. . .").
16
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have developed a robust literature on ethics in social movement lawyering,
social change lawyers do not today dictate to their clients what their goals
can or should be. Lawyers understand the importance of being client-
centered and following their clients' direction as legal ethics rules require.
This, I believe, is the key difference between old and new styles of social
movement lawyering.
Example three of Cummings' series of old canon narratives is Roe v.
Wade.35 Cummings points out that commentators, even avid feminists,
have criticized the Court's reasoning in Roe.36 Yet one cannot blame the
problems of Roe's doctrinal grounding on the lawyers in that case. Justice
Blackmun wrote the Court's majority opinion, and he chose to introduce
a medicalized trimester concept to determine abortion's legality, as well
as the concept of balancing a "potential" for life. 37 These approaches did
not come from arguments urged on the Court by the parties to the case;
instead, Blackmun's prior strong interest in medical matters appears to
have been responsible. 38 To be sure, Roe also rests on a substantive due
process analysis that scholars have found problematic, but it was not the
Roe litigators who created that doctrinal conundrum.
What is a far more fair criticism of the two main litigators in Roe-
Sarah Weddington and Linda Coffee (who were so unexperienced that
neither had tried a case before)-is that they viewed their client, Norma
McCorvey, as a mere excuse for bringing a test case. 39 As McCorvey has
expressed many times since the case, she in retrospect felt "used" by and
Weddington and Coffee.40 Indeed, multiple players on both sides of the
abortion battle have "co-authored" with and otherwise deployed
McCorvey for various political positions over the years.' McCorvey of
course deserves her own agency in the development of her viewpoints.
Although her views about abortion have changed, she has far more
consistently voiced resentment at the condescension she felt that well-
educated and wealthier activists exhibited toward her as a struggling,
35. Cummings, supra note 1, at 441 (citingRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
36. Id. at 447-48 (noting criticism of Roe).
37. Roe, 410 U.S. at 115, 150.
38. See MARIAN FAUX, ROE V. WADE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE LANDMARK
SUPREME COURT DECISION THAT MADE ABORTION LEGAL 289, 297, 301 (1988) (describing
Blackmun's medically focused view).
39. Id. at 11 (describing lawyers' motives for taking this case as "primarily
ideological").
40. See, e.g., NORMAMCCORVEY, IAMROE 127 (1994) [hereinafterMcCORVEY
1] ("1 was nothing to Sarah and Linda, nothing more than just a name on a piece of paper");
NORMA MCCORVEY, WON BY LovE 21 (1997) [hereinafter MCCORVEY II] ("Sarah had all
the time in the world for me before I signed up as her plaintiff; but once she had my
signature, I was a blue-collar, rough-talking embarrassment."); id. at 29 (claiming
Weddington "used" her).
41. Compare MCCORVEY I, supra note 40, with MCCORVEY II, supra note 40.
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working-class woman.4 2 Lawyering across class divides raises precisely
the kinds of ethics issues in which "new canon" ethics scholars have been
intensely interested.43
One hopes that the more ethically sensitive social movement lawyers
of today would have handled McCorvey's situation differently, exploring
what their client truly wanted and striving to help her understand what the
law could and could not do for her. Such lawyering might even have led
to a more fitting case theory, which might have emphasized the financial
dimensions of McCorvey's inability to terminate her pregnancy-though
it is doubtful that this case theory would have been met with the Court's
favor given its unsympathetic jurisprudence on matters of economic
inequality.
In sum, to the extent that Roe is an example of old canon lawyering,
it arguably stands as an example of the insufficient care old canon lawyers
paid to the primacy of clients' agency in charting the goals for test cases
brought in their names.
Roe does not, to my mind, illustrate that old canon lawyers were too
focused on court-centered social change strategies. Marian Faux's account
of the litigation illustrates this point well.44 As Faux points out, the
activists supporting Roe v. Wade were by no means placing their faith in a
favorable verdict from the United States Supreme Court. In fact, as in
Brown, the fate of the case was far from certain. Activists were battling
hard on many fronts. They fought a major legislative campaign for pro-
choice legislation in Texas, which they lost, and they then fought a major
defensive campaign in New York to prevent the rolling back of pro-choice
legislation in that state, which they again lost, to their surprise and
dismay. In the meantime, abortion became a major political issue that
figured prominently at the highest level of the United States electoral
process after Richard Nixon identified it as a useful wedge issue and began
campaigning against it in his presidential reelection campaign.
Activists on the pro-choice side fought among each other. Some were
radical, some very moderate, and some in between. They disagreed among
themselves about strategy and ideology just as activists in contemporary,
42. MCCORVEY II, supra note 40, at 2, 29, 33-34, 35, 45, 46 (expressing
resentment at her treatment by activists in the pro-choice movement).
43. See, e.g., Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Client Narrative and
Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 485-90 (1994) (exploring how differing
socioeconomic class locations affect relationships between clients and lawyers).
44. FAUX, supra note 38.
45. See id. at 253.
46. Id. at 276 (noting that new Court appointments had begun to tilt the Court in
a more conservative direction).
47. See, e.g., id at 201, 215, 258 (describing various legislative efforts and
failures).
48. Id. at 257, 261.
18
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messy social change movements do. 4 9 This messiness existed in the past
just as it does today; it is the process of constructing historical memory
that makes long-ago events seem more coherent than contemporary
situations.
Thus, in the Roe v. Wade example too, I do not see any significant
difference between old and new canon lawyering with regard to basic
choices among strategic options. Like all major social change campaigns,
activists on and within both sides of the debate about abortion policy,
including lawyers, used every political and legal forum available and did
so with a messy variety of emphases and goals. Activist lawyers do this
today just as they did historically during the times of "old canon"
lawyering. Social movement lawyers may be better as strategists today,
but they are not qualitatively different as strategists. What does differ
about new canon social movement lawyering-at least among most
progressive-leaning activist-lawyers-is an ethical sensibility that thinks
far harder about lawyers' duties to be client-centered in their work.
Further support for my thesis that there has been a substantial
qualitative change in social movement lawyers' ethical sensibilities comes
from my research on early racial justice activism. In this work, I came
across a number of examples of social movement lawyers disregarding
their clients by dropping and settling cases without client permission when
it seemed expedient to do so.5 o A plausible hypothesis worth exploring
more fully posits that an important difference between old and new canon
lawyering involves the amount of attention lawyers paid to their ethics
duties to clients.
Cummings' final example of old canon lawyering involves welfare
rights. Relying largely on Martha Davis's critical account of lawyers' role
in the welfare rights movement," Cummings points out that litigation-
centered advocacy on welfare rights largely failed.5 2 Moreover, these
failures led to critiques of litigation and court-centered strategies for
achieving social change.5 3 Yet poor people's movements over the
twentieth century were not always litigation focused, as scholars such as
49. See, e.g., id. at 208-11 (describing these contentious differences).
50. See, e.g., CARLE, supra note 17, at 62-64 (documenting examples of cases
civil rights lawyers settled without consultation with clients). These were grassroots
lawyers, operating on minimal income and confronting major race discrimination barriers.
Only some found it possible to sustain themselves through full-time law practice.
51. MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993) (cited in Cummings, supra note 1, at 448-449 & n. 38).
52. Cummings, supra note 1, at 450.
53. Id.
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Frances Fox Piven, Richard Cloward," and Tomiko Brown-Nagin show."
The perspective one holds about what "old canon" lawyering involved can
depend on which aspects of a complex collective movement one
emphasizes. If one focuses on court-centered strategies, one may conclude
that a complex social change movement was too focused on court-centered
strategies, but that may be because that is the part of the elephant one is
touching.
II. NEW CANON LAWYERING
Cummings argues that new canon lawyering differs from old canon
lawyering in that, inter alia, new canon lawyers pay more attention to
institutions other than courts as well as to the intersection of law and
politics. 6 As I have already argued, old canon lawyers paid attention to
institutions other than courts and to the intersection of law and politics as
well. Cummings adds a third feature of new canon lawyering with which
I agree-namely, that new canon lawyers are more sensitive to the
relationship between their political and ideological lawyering goals, on the
one hand, and the obligations they owe the human beings who stand before
them as clients, on the other. 7 They are, in other words, more attuned to
legal ethics. There are interesting historical reasons for this development,
arising out of Bell's critique of the post-Brown lawyers, as discussed
above, and leading to the development of a rich literature on the ethics of
so-called "public interest" and "social movement" lawyers, as Cummings
and many other legal scholars have traced.'
This short Response provides too little room to delve deeply into the
intellectual history of this literature, but a brief overview is in order. Lucie
White's early work modelled a methodology based on a microanalysis of
the ethics of client-lawyer interactions.59 A sampling of the most cited
54. See generally FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S
MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAL (1971) (arguing that disruption and
insurgency proved the most successful means for poor people to cause change).
55. See generally TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND
THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVI RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2012) (discussing the grassroots
strategies of the welfare rights mothers in contrast to the litigation strategies of Thurgood
Marshall and the NAACP).
56. Cummings, supra note 1, at 451 ("new canon stories focus on legal
institutions outside of court; they are primarily concerned with the interaction between law
and politics .... ).
57. Id. (new canon stories "portray lawyers as sensitive to movement dynamics
and the potential for overreaching .... ).
58. See, e.g., Scott Cummings, Movement Lawyering, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1645
(2017) (tracing the history of movement lawyering through a legal ethicists' eyes).
59. Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) (analyzing the ethics
of her interactions with a legal aid client early in her practice career).
20
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subsequent works in this genre60 includes Tony Alfieri's call for lawyers
to pay more attention to client narratives, 6' Robert Dinerstein's classic
article exploring reasons for client-centered counseling "based on political
empowerment ... for clients who historically and currently need political
empowerment,"62 and William Rubenstein's exploration of conflicts
issues in group litigation with civil rights goals. 63 Ann Southworth
surveyed what social movement lawyers actually thought about the ethics
question of the appropriate allocation of decision-making responsibilities
between lawyers and clients and concluded that these lawyers held
nuanced and varied opinions.6 4
By the early 2000s, Cummings had become an important voice in this
developing literature, identifying the "movement lawyering" paradigm, as
opposed to public interest or poverty lawyering, as an important area for
more specific study.6' Around the same time, progressive scholars
interested in poverty lawyering began to call on lawyers to adopt an
expanded ethics focus on duties to communities rather than individuals
alone. Moral philosopher, clinician and ethics scholar Kate Kruse
synthesized various strands of this scholarship, exploring the
strategies of a new generation of lawyers practicing law for
socially and politically disadvantaged clients [by] seeking
greater participation from clients in the formation of collective
goals, while at the same time recognizing that the clients'
60. The articles featured here come up as among the most cited works in Westlaw
using the search terms "social movement" and "legal ethics" and lawyer!.
61. Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons
of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2146-47 (1991) (urging lawyers for low-income
clients to pay more attention to client narratives).
62. Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and
Refinement, 32 ARIz. L. REV. 501, 505 (1990).
63. William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among
Group Members andLawyers in CivilRights Campaigns, 106 YALEL.J. 1623, 1625 (1997)
(examining how legal ethics considerations should structure group decisions in civil rights
litigation).
64. Ann Southworth, Lawyer-ClientDecisionmaking in Civil Rights and Poverty
Practice: An Empirical Study of Lawyers' Norms, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1101, 1101
(1996) (presenting results of a survey of lawyers' views about ethics issues).
65. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law
and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REv. 443, 443 (2001) (analyzing legal ethics and other issues
posed by lawyering that combines grassroots organizing with legal advocacy).
66. See, e.g., Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6
CLINICAL L. REv. 427 (2000) (explaining ethical and other arguments for involving clients
in collective efforts to speak for themselves about injustice); Michael Diamond,
Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv.
67 (2000) (arguing that lawyers should become "more active in organizing and developing
client groups and in developing and implementing strategies that increase the long-term
political power of clients").
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capacity for voicing collective values may have to be
consciously created, rather than merely received."
Cummings and Rhode collaborated on synthesizing the state of this
scholarship,68 and Cummings' work then exploded in a string of articles
on social movement lawyering, of which the piece under discussion is but
one example.
Where this ethics scholarship will go is not yet clear. What is certain,
I propose, is that it is the ethics of movement lawyering, far more than the
selection of strategies or tactics, that has changed over time. Indeed,
Cummings' examples of new canon lawyering show that new canon
lawyers do use courts when there are good reasons to do so, just as old
canon lawyers used strategies other than courts in many instances. In
Cummings' first example, the Los Angeles anti-sweatshop campaign, he
discusses an important lawsuit filed to enforce certain key legal
principles. 69 Lawyers and activists used this precedent to design "an
impact litigation template."70 Activists combined this work with a media
strategy and worker organizing. Their strategic decision was "not to rely
on litigation alone and instead to build an advocacy infrastructure that
would complement and bolster law." 7 ' The same can be said for virtually
any social movement that seeks to use and/or change law; activists
combine multiple strategies and tactics, including litigation where
warranted.
Cummings discusses other organizations and campaigns, all of which
he describes as combining multiple strategies with litigation.72 He points
to intra-movement dissent as a distinguishing feature of new canon
lawyering, 73 though of course, as Cummings well knows, intra-movement
disagreements are a characteristic of virtually all social movements, as I
have already noted with respect to Roe. Cummings' example of "Litigating
Human Rights in the War on Terror, "'7 as he phrases it, involves human
rights activists primarily fighting a campaign through the courts. This
makes perfect sense given that the human rights needing protection
belonged to persons lacking the power to mobilize politically. Cummings
points out those mobilization strategies included other targets as well, such
67. Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 103, 153 (2010).
68. Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights
from Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603 (2009).
69. Cummings, supra note 1, at 454-55 (discussing Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922
F. Supp. 1450 (C.D. Cal. 1996)).
70. Id. at 456.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 457 (discussing cases activists filed against fashion retailers).
73. Id. at459.
74. Id. at 460.
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as media, foreign governments, the United Nations and other international
bodies. 7 ' By way of comparison showing similarities, one may turn to an
excellent account of the NAACP's strategy to highlight race
discrimination as a human rights issue before the United Nations.
Everything new turns out to be old again.
Next Cummings discusses the Marriage Equality Movement (MEM),
tracing how brilliant strategists started with state law victories and only
pushed for a United States Supreme Court constitutional ruling after they
had won over the hearts and minds of voters.7 7 To be sure, this was a
brilliantly conceived and orchestrated campaign, based on sophisticated
use of media strategies and polling data. While I agree that it is different
in sophistication from all that came before, I do not believe the MEM was
different in kind.
Although it has thus far succeeded in avoiding the problems of severe
backlash, as Cummings points out, the future of Obergefell v. HodgeS79 is
unclear as I write this given a probable shift in the political balance among
the members of the United States Supreme Court. State pro equality law
can probably continue to stand, but the constitutional law principle
enshrining marriage rights for gay and lesbian people across the land may
not. This vulnerability to changing ideologies among the majority of
justices on the Supreme Court is a perennial problem that social change
movements face in relying on Supreme Court precedents. Note, however,
that the "old canon" case of Brown, despite having faced political backlash
at the time, now seems inviolate, showing that short-term political fallout
does not necessarily predict long-term staying power. Instead, it seems that
principles of justice that endure political backlash, if they survive, may
potentially be inoculated from future political challenge.
Moreover, it bears noting, Obergefell has been criticized for murky
doctrinal grounding, much like Roe v. Wade was decades ago as already
discussed.so The forces that may render social movement gains fragile are
many. At bottom, what Cummings' case studies show is that social change
through law in any of its many possible forms involves a messy,
unpredictable, fragile and reversible process, precisely due to the complex
interactions among politics, popular opinion, case law, constitutional
principles, counter-mobilizations and a host of other factors.
75. Id. at 468.
76. See CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944-1955 (2003) (tracing the
NAACP's campaign to highlight race discrimination as an international human rights issue
before the United Nations).
77. Cummings, supra note 1, at 473-78.
78. Id. at 475.
79. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
80. See supra notes 35-3 8 and accompanying text.
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One can make similar points about Cummings' next case studies,
involving immigrants' rights and the "Movement for Black Lives.""'
Immigrants' rights activists have combined legislative and litigation
campaigns, and their lawyers have "remained skeptical of courts" 8 2-as
well they should have given courts' hostility to their clients-just as
lawyers in the early stages of racial justice organizing did for the very same
reason, as already discussed. What Cummings eloquently describes as
being different about these "new canon" campaigns is the care lawyers
take to stay in sync with their clients' perspectives and decisions as
opposed to adopting an attitude of lawyer knows best.83 Cummings often
characterizes this approach as a strategic difference between old and new
canon lawyering, whereas I would characterize it as a difference in ethical
sensibilities.
Finally, Cummings describes the movement spurred by Black Lives
Matter (BLM) and similar work. 4 Again, many of the admirable gains
Cummings captures in the way new canon lawyers interact with the BLM
organizations go to lawyers' ethics in relation to clients or social
movement constituencies rather than to strategic choices about what
mechanisms to employ in working for social change."' What I find most
interesting and different from the old canon period is the contemporary
focus on how traditional social power continues to operate within social
movements and lawyers' ethical responsibilities to attend to such factors.
Thus, Cummings writes, "some voices within the growing BLM
movement . . . are critical of how mainstream legal responses . . . have
reinforced the marginalization of already-marginalized voices within the
broader movement for police accountability and undermined more
fundamental criminal justice reform."86 The origins of these concerns anse
from feminist critiques of the male-dominated leadership of the left, which
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, followed by black women's critiques of
white women's feminism, and a host of other serious, thoughtful work on
understanding how power works within social movements as in other
institutions.
In a final section, Cummings outlines the lessons he sees embedded
in his case studies. Here he tends to conflate the aspect of his argument
that has the most menit-i.e., the development of a social movement
81. See Cummings, supra note 1, at 478-94.
82. Id. at 482.
83. See id. at 478-87.
84. Id. at 487-94.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 493 (citing Amna Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93
N.Y.U. L. REV. 405 (2018)).
87. See, e.g., CHERRIE MORAGA ET AL., EDS., THIS BRIDGE CALLED My BACK:
WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (2d ed. 1983) (collecting critiques of how social
privilege operates in the feminist movement).
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lawyering sensibility calling for deeper ethical reflection-with an aspect
I find far less convincing. He writes, "the form of legal mobilization in
new canon campaigns thus diverges from the old canon emphasis on
lawyer control and elite planning oriented toward rights-based court
challenges.""" Yet I see no inherent or necessary connection between
lawyer control and elite planning, on the one hand, and rights-based court
challenges, on the other. The two concepts-(1) lawyer domination and
(2) strategic decisions about campaign tactics-are not inherently
correlated-at least, more research testing that proposition would be
required to reach this conclusion.
Similarly, Cummings' case examples belie his conclusion that "in the
absence of a political movement, litigation becomes a central tool to check
government power."89 As I have discussed, his examples all show political
strategies and litigation occurring together. Cummings makes many
observations that are undeniably accurate; for example, it is easier to
enforce negative rights through constitutional law than positive rights to
the resources needed for human flourishing; 90 backlash and counter-
mobilization remain persistent threats to attempts at deep social change;
and the more radical versus more mainstream wings of social movements
tend to disagree with each other.91 Cummings ends his fascinating article
with the thought that perhaps the critique of the old canon "may have less
to do with the advocates and more with the nature of their adversaries."92
I disagree. As I have argued, the key difference his examples highlight has
to do with the changing ethical sensibilities of the lawyers involved.
CONCLUSION
To be sure, lawyers with stronger ethical sensibilities about their
duties to clients and social movement constituencies may be more
efficacious, especially if we believe that clients are more reliable ultimate
judges as to what is in their best interests than their lawyers are. If that is
true, then delivering client-centered lawyering to those without easy
access to the levers of power may offer the best odds for bringing about a
more just world. Of course, this assumption is itself the product of
ideologies specific to an historical context. It may be that future
generations of scholars and activists will have different understandings of
appropriate social movement lawyering ethics, just as reflection on the
88. Cummings, supra note 1, at 494.
89. Id. at 495.
90. Id. at 498 (noting the usual framing of Supreme Court arguments "around
vindication of negative liberty interests rather than affirmative claims of equality.")
(citation omitted).
91. Id. at 500.
92. Id.
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social movement lawyers of the twentieth century introduced a different
ethical sensibility concerning social movement lawyers' duties to clients.
The growing opus of Cummings' important work most certainly will
continue to lead that ongoing charge.
